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Vassallo: Insurance - Insurance Coverage against Punitive Damages - Sinclai

Insurance-Insurance Coverage Against Punitive Damages. Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1984).
In 1976, Sinclair Oil Corporation purchased an excess liability insurance policy from Columbia Casualty Company.' While the Columbia
policy was in effect, Robert Bohenna sustained serious injuries at the
Sinclair refinery.2 Mr. Bohenna and his wife sued Sinclair, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. After a trial on the merits, a jury returned a verdict against Sinclair, awarding $375,000 in compensatory
liable for punitive damages, based
damages. The jury also found Sinclair
3
on willful and wanton misconduct.
In accordance with Wyoming's bifurcated trial procedure, 4 the court
scheduled the second phase of the trial to determine the measure of
punitive damages. On the day before the second phase was to begin, Columbia informed Sinclair that it would not indemnify Sinclair against liability for punitive damages because insurance coverage against ptinitive
damages was contrary to the public policy of the State of Wyoming.2
Having been informed that Columbia would not pay punitive damages,
Sinclair settled the claim, incurring $280,000 in losses "within the coverage
layer of the Columbia policy."" Sinclair then sued Columbia in the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming, seeking to recover on
the insurance contract. Sinclair contended that the policy covered punitive
damages, relying on the policy language, the absence of exclusions, and
its own reasonable expectations of coverage.' Columbia moved for summary judgment, asserting that the insurance policy did not cover liability for punitive damages because such coverage would defeat the punishment and deterrent aspects of those damages and was therefore contrary
to public policy. For purposes of its motion for summary judgment, in
order to remove any questions of fact, Columbia admitted that the policy
terms were broad enough to cover punitive damages.
In order to rule on Columbia's motion for summary judgment, the
district court certified the following questions to the Wyoming Supreme
Court:
1. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 976 (Wyo. 1984). The
insurance policy provided $300,000 in coverage for liability in excess of a $100,000 self-insured
retention and a $300,000 first level excess liability policy issued by another insurance company. Under the self-insured retention, Sinclair undertook the obligations of investigation,
defense of claims, reporting developments to excess carriers, and covering losses up to
$100,000. Brief for Defendant at 6, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d
975 (Wyo. 1984).
2. Id. Mr. Bohenna received sulphuric acid burns while unloading a tanker. Sinclair's
emergency shower allegedly did not work, and Mr. Bohenna's injuries were thereby aggravated. Brief for Plaintiff at 6-7, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d
975 (Wyo. 1984) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff].
3. Sinclair, 682 P.2d at 977.
4. See Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981).
5. Sinclair, 682 P.2d at 977.
6. Id.
7. In the alternative, Sinclair claimed that the equitable principles of estoppel and
waiver should prevent Columbia from denying coverage. The court did not reach these issues.
Id. at 978.
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Where a general liability policy is broad enough to cover
punitive damages and makes no distinction between compensatory
or punitive damages, and there is no exclusion in the policy against
coverage for punitive damages, does Wyoming public policy prohibit the enforcement of punitive damage coverage in the following circumstances:
a) For vicarious liability of the insured as to punitive damages
under applicable Wyoming law and the instructions given in the
Bohenna case on the basis of willful and wanton conduct?
b) For personal liability of the insured as to punitive damages
under applicable Wyoming law and the instructions given in the
Bohenna case on the basis of willful and wanton conduct?8
The court answered both questions in the negative, holding that insurance coverage against either personal or vicarious liability for punitive
damages, based on willful or wanton misconduct, is not contrary to Wyoming public policy.9 In reaching this decision, the court balanced two conflicting doctrines-the purpose of punitive damages and freedom of
contract-and decided that freedom of contract should prevail.
THE RATIONALE BEHIND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

While some jurisdictions recognize punitive damages as a form of compensation for the plaintiff, the vast majority justify them in terms of
punishing the wrongdoer and deterring his future misconduct. 0 Wyoming
follows the majority view. In a long line of cases beginning with the 1902
case of Cosgriff v. Miller,II and continuing through the 1984 case of Adel
v. Parkhurst,'" the Wyoming Supreme Court has consistently held that
the purposes of imposing punitive damages are to punish and deter, and
not to compensate the plaintiff.
All jurisdictions generally agree that mere negligence will not support a punitive damages claim. 3 A higher degree of culpability is required.
Some jurisdictions will impose punitive damages for gross negligence.'
But in Wyoming, to be liable for punitive damages, a defendant must6
5
engage in "willful or wanton" misconduct. In Danculovich v. Brown,'
the Wyoming Supreme Court described willful and wanton misconduct
as an act or omission committed "in reckless disregard of the consequences, and under such circumstances and conditions that a reasonable
8. Id. at 976.
9. Id. at 981.

10. J.GHIARDI

& J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 4.01-.16 (1984).
11. 10 Wyo. 190, 68 P. 206 (1902),
12. 681 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1984). In this case, decided one day before Sinclair,the court
reiterated the "punishment and deterrence" theme. Id at 890. Yet, one day later, in Sinclair,
the court seriously questioned the deterrent value of punitive damages.
13. W_ PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 2, at 10 (1971).
14. J.GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 10, at § 5.01.
15. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979).

16. Id.
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man would know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would,1 in
7
a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another."
PUBLIC POLICY

Under Wyoming law, an insurance contract or any provision contained
therein which is contrary to public policy is unenforceable.' 8 In defining
public policy, courts first look to the state's constitution, statutes, and
judicial decisions. If these sources do not speak to the matter, public policy
"refers to a principle of law that holds no one can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public" or is "against the public
good." 9 On its surface, this broad definition of public policy seems to give
courts great latitude in voiding private agreements. The courts are limited
in this area, however, by the freedom of contract doctrine. Wyoming case
law reflects a reluctance to void contracts on public policy grounds unless
they clearly conflict with "public right or the public welfare." 2
INSURANCE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Although the principal case was one of first impression in Wyoming,
other jurisdictions have produced an abundance of case law dealing with
insurance against punitive damages.2" The question typically arises when
an insurance company has issued a policy, containing vague terms, which
may or may not cover punitive damages. 22 In many cases the court will
first interpret the contract to determine whether or not punitive damages
are indeed covered. Some courts, however, may refuse to interpret the contract, on the grounds that public policy would preclude coverage in any
event. 23 If the contract is deemed to provide coverage, the public policy
question must be addressed.
On the issue of public policy, two lines of authority have developed.
One view is that insurance coverage thwarts the purposes behind punitive
damages, and therefore coverage should not be permitted.' Some courts
which accept this view make an exception where the defendant's liability
is purely vicarious, reasoning that such a defendant is personally blameless
and should not be punished.2 5 The opposite view holds that punitive
17. Id. at 193.
18. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dep't, 672 P.2d 810, 816 (Wyo. 1983).
19. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 978 (Wyo. 1982).
20. Chicago and N.W. Ry. v. Rissler, 184 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Wyo. 1960).
21. See Annot., 17 A.L.R. 4TH 11 (1982).
22. Considering the number of reported cases in this area, there is no longer any excuse for an insurance company to issue a policy containing ambiguous terms as to whether
or not coverage includes punitive damages. In 1977, the Insurance Services office promulgated
a uniform punitive damages exclusion, which was approved by thirty-three jurisdictions but
was later withdrawn. Burrell and Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. 1, 10-11 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434 (5th
Cir. 1962).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92
(ND. Ind. 1976).
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damages are often ineffectual, regardless of whether or not insurance
coverage is involved, and therefore, the asserted public policy is not strong
26
enough to justify the avoidance of a voluntary contractual obligation.
The leading case supporting the anti-coverage position is Northwestern
National Casualty Co. v. McNulty.27 In that case, a drunk driver crashed
into the plaintiff's car and left the scene of the accident. After a jury trial,
the plaintiff was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The
defendant's insurance company refused to pay the punitive damage claim,
asserting that the insurance policy did not cover punitive damages, and
even if it did, public policy precluded such coverage. The court found it
unnecessary to interpret the contract, holding that insurance coverage
against punitive damages frustrates the punitive and deterrent functions
of those damages:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment
of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be void as
violative of public policy. The same public policy should invalidate
any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that
punitive damages represent. 8
The pro-coverage argument was perhaps best expressed by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Lazenby v. Universal Underwriter'sInsurance Co. 29 Lazenby also involved the question of coverage against
punitive damages imposed for drunk driving. The Lazenby court quoted
the McNulty case at length, and then reached the opposite conslusion.
First, the court rejected the idea that the unavailability of insurance
coverage would deter irresponsible driving. 0 Second, the court reasoned
that the average insured would expect to be covered for punitive damage
liability where no intentional tort was committed.3 ' Third, the court noted
that a fine line existed between ordinary negligence and conduct for which
punitive damages could be awarded.3 2 Finally, the court decided that the
public policy favoring non-coverage was not clear enough to void a private
contract. 3
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In Sinclair, the Wyoming Supreme Court found itself faced with two
"competing policies": the purposes of punitive damages on one hand, and
26. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d
1 (1964).
27. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
28. Id. at 440.
29. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
30. Id. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court did not expand on this point. Subsequent cases, however, including
Sinclair,more fully explain the argument. See infra text accompanying note 41.
33. Id.
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the freedom to contract for insurance coverage on the other.3 4 After summarizing the facts and the parties' contentions, the court promptly defended the freedom of contract doctrine, while expressing disdain for the
"vague and nebulous concept" of public policy:
"Public policy is a very unruly horse and once you get astride it
you never know where it will carry you. [citations omitted]"
We will not invalidate a contract entered into freely by competent parties on the basis of public policy unless that policy is
well settled, unambiguous and not in conflict with another public
policy equally or more compelling."
The court declared that its own past justifications for punitive
damages-punishment and deterrence-did not constitute a public policy
that was sufficiently "clear and unequivocal" to preclude punitive damage
coverage.36 After quoting at length from both McNulty and Lazenby, the
court noted its agreement with all of the conclusions of the Lazenby
court. 7
One of the major arguments advanced in the Lazenby decision was
that punitive damages do not deter misconduct, regardless of insurance
coverage."9 By adhering to the Lazenby analysis, the Wyoming Supreme
Court forced itself to re-evaluate those purposes behind punitive damages
which it had previously embraced. Noting a lack of empirical proof supporting the deterrence theory, the court admitted that "[plunishment is
39
perhaps the only actual goal realized in a punitive damage award."
Apart from questioning the deterrence value of punitive damages, the
court based its decision on two other grounds. First, the court observed
that the border between conduct justifying punitive damages and conduct not justifying those damages was a "fine line." A refusal of insurance
coverage based on this somewhat flexible standard would be "necessarily arbitary. "40 Second, the court explained that because the insurance
the insured
agreement purported to indemnify against "all claims,"
1
reasonably expected coverage for punitive damages.4
Finally, the court ruled that one could insure against vicarious, as well
as personal, liability for punitive damages.4" The considerations involv34. Sinclair,682 P.2d at 978.

35. Id. at 979.
36. Id. at 980.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 980-81.
Lazenby, 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
Sinclair,682 P.2d at 981.
Id. at 980.

41. Id. at 981. Sinclair was the first case in which the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the "reasonable expectations" doctrine. In a 1980 case, the court declined to discuss
the concept. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Lythgoe, 618 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Wyo. 1980).
42. Id.
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ing vicarious liability, the court said, were the same as those for personal
liability.43 Curiously, the court identified deterrence as one of those
considerations."
ANALYsIs OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The policy considerations raised in Sinclairpresent a myriad of problems. The Montana Supreme Court recently described a similar case as
a Gordian knot.4 5 The attempt to untangle this knot invariably leads to
an inquiry into the foundations of the punitive damages doctrine.
In undertaking such an inquiry, the Wyoming Supreme Court summarily discarded the deterrence theory, and suggested that punishment
is the only purpose served by punitive damages. 6 Apparently, the court
felt that insurability destroyed the deterrence function (which, it says,
probably didn't exist anyway), but not the punishment function. Therefore,
the argument presumably goes, insurance against punitive damages does
not frustrate their single remaining purpose: punishment. This analysis
falls short on both points. First, while punitive damages do not always
deter misconduct, they do serve as a deterrent in some situations. Second,
even if punishment were the only purpose achieved by punitive damages,
that purpose is diluted, if not completely destroyed in some cases, when
an insurance company picks up the tab.
The court said that it knew of no empirical proof which showed that
punitive damages deter misconduct4 7 Commentators point out that the
average person either does not understand or is completely unaware of
the concept of punitive damages, and therefore he cannot be deterred by
them. 48 This observation is probably accurate. Yet, in the commercial and
corporate sector, where legal advice is close at hand and often solicited,
potential defendants are probably not ignorant of the punitive damage
doctrine. Here, the deterrent function does exist.49
Turning to the punishment aspect of punitive damages, the court suggested that this is the only purpose achieved through punitive damages."'
But the court failed to explain how this purpose is served when an insurance company, and not the party at fault, pays the penalty. In some
cases, the threat of increased premiums and the possibility of damages
exceeding policy limits may preserve the punishment aspect, as well as
the deterrent aspect, of punitive damages.5' Yet in those cases where
43. Id.
44. Id.

679 P.2d
Mont. __,
45. First Bank (N.A.) - Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 1217, 1223 (Mont. 1984).
46. Sinclair, 682 P.2d at 981.
47. Id. The court, however, offered no proof to show that punitive damages do not deter

misconduct.
48. See, e.g., J.

GHIARDI

& J. KiRCHER, supra note 10, at § 2.09.

49. Id.
50. Sinclair,682 P.2d at 981.
51. Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972).
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damages do not exceed policy limits, the tortfeasor has indeed purchased,
at a relatively small cost, the freedom to engage in willful and wanton
misconduct. In Sinclair,the court answered this argument by saying that
insurance coverage against punitive damages is against public policy if
"the fact of insurance coverage can be related in some substantial way
to the commission of such wrongful acts."52 The idea is appealing, but
proving the relationship will not always be easy.
On purely theoretical grounds, it is hard to agree with the court's
public policy analysis. Instead of narrowing its justification for punitive
damages so that the only remaining purpose is punishment, the court could
have recognized two additional purposes behind punitive damages." The
availability of punitive damages encourages plaintiffs, and their counsel,
to prosecute meritorious claims which would otherwise never be pursued.
A plaintiff may have suffered an egregious civil wrong, while suffering
little in the way of pecuniary loss. Limitation to recovery of actual
damages may dissuade him from litigating his claim. Here, insurance
coverage actually enhances a reason for the existence of punitive damages,
by guaranteeing a solvent defendant and thereby providing the plaintiff
with the incentive to remedy a civil wrong. Punitive damages also compensate plaintiffs for actual damages, such as litigation costs and attorney
fees, which might not otherwise be recovered. If one accepts the majority
view that punitive damages should not compensate the plaintiff, it
becomes difficult to explain why the plaintiff, and not the state, receives
the award.
As a practical matter, insurability against punitive damages raises
another consideration. In Wyoming, as in many jurisdictions, the measure
of punitive damages assessed against a defendant must be related to his
wealth. 4 Yet, a jury cannot be told whether, or to what extent, a defendant is insured. 5 If a defendant is allowed to insure against punitive
damages, and a jury is informed of his wealth but not his insurance status,
the jury cannot possibly come up with a meaningful measure of punitive
damages.
On the other hand, practical problems arise when insurability is denied.
First, such an approach causes a conflict of interest between the defendant and his insurer. A small compensatory award coupled with large
punitive damages will benefit the insurer. The insurer's trial tactics may
be accordingly affected. Second, settlement negotiations may be
hampered if an insured is denied coverage for punitive damages.57 Because
it may be difficult or impossible to apportion between compensatory and
52. Sinclair, 682 P.2d at 981.
53. For an historical background of punitive damages and their purposes, see Beli,
Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1 (1980).
54. Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 892 (Wyo. 1984).
55. Eagan v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 509-10, 21 P.2d 821, 822 (1933).
56. Comment, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance: Theory, Reality, and Practicality, 9 CuM. L. REV. 487, 517 (1978).
57. Id. at 518.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1985

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 20 [1985], Iss. 1, Art. 14

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XX

punitive damages in a settlement figure, an insurer might be less likely
to settle, thinking that in settling he will be subjected to greater liability
than if he goes to trial.
OTHER FACTORS SURROUNDING THE SINCLAIR CASE

While the court in Sinclair premised its decision on a perceived
weakness in the insurer's public policy argument, one might surmise that
the case was really decided on other grounds. From the time Sinclair's
policy was written, the insurer's conduct was less than commendable. The
insurer issued the policy knowing full well that it might be called upon
to pay a punitive damage claim."' Yet, the company used broad, ambiguous
language and omitted a punitive damage exclusion, while apparently reserving the self-granted option of denying payment for punitive damages."
Then, when Sinclair's claim arose, the company attempted to avoid payment, hiding behind amorphous concepts of public policy.
The insurance policy stated that Columbia would indemnify Sinclair
against "all claims, ' 6 ° and the premium presumably reflected coverage
for punitive as well as compensatory damages. If the court voided the
contract on public policy grounds, Columbia would have gained the benefit
of the full premium while avoiding its voluntary obligation to indemnify
Sinclair. In addition to this, Columbia waited until the day before the
punitive damage trial to inform Sinclair that it would not cover punitive
damages.6 1
It is hard to believe that the Wyoming Supreme Court did not take
these factors into account. This is unfortunate, because the public policy
question, the only question the court actually answered, was deserving
of more serious analysis than the court ultimately devoted to it.
CONCLUSION

In Sinclair, the Wyoming Supreme Court clearly concluded that
punitive damages are insurable. It is now up to insurance companies to
decide whether or not they will agree to cover such damages. If a company does not wish to include punitive damage coverage in a liability
policy, it may simply insert an exclusion in the policy. Such an exclusion
would not be a novel development. Most liability policies presently62exclude coverage for damages resulting from intentional misconduct. If
a company wishes to include coverage for punitive damages, it should do
so in express language within the policy. Insurance rates can be adjusted
accordingly.
58. Columbia apparently followed an "undisclosed corporate plan" regarding punitive
damages, in anticipation of possible controversy. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 2, at 9-11.
59. Id.

60. Sinclair, 682 P.2d at 981.
61. Id. at 977.
62. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 14, at § 7.02.
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Because a punitive damage award, not insured against, could financially destroy a defendant, the insured's counsel should demand a liability policy that expressly includes coverage for punitive damages. Counsel
should insist on a provision that includes punitive damages in clear terms,
to avoid the possibility of contract-interpretation litigation.
In Sinclair,the Wyoming Supreme Court explicity and implicity questioned the traditional rationales behind punitive damages. The case
demonstrates that generalities in this area are dangerous. In some cases,
the possibility of punitive damages may deter misconduct; in others, they
may serve as punishment. Punitive damages do not always serve both
purposes in a given case. In fact, they may serve neither purpose. But
punitive damages will encourage plaintiffs to pursue claims which may
benefit society as a whole. They will also reimburse plaintiffs for actual
damages, such as litigation costs and attorney fees, which might not otherwise be recovered. To ignore these functions is, as one court has said, to
ignore practical reality.6 3 In order to resolve the inconsistency between
the rationale behind punitive damages and the allowance of insurance
against them, the Wyoming Supreme Court should openly recognize these
additional functions served by punitive damages.
NICHOLAS VASSALLO

63. Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W.Va. 1981).
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